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Comments on Army Proposal

- I. The attached is a classic of nebulous thinking because it premises its goal on what the "crisis" amendment to NSCID 1 requires, allots deficiencies to the Check List Committee on duties which were never assigned to the Check List Group, and thirdly, assumes a responsibility for the Intelligence ADVISORY Committee in the actual production of National Intelligence Estimates which reduces CIA to the kind of interdepartmental spawning agency which CIG was before the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.
- II. The Check List System was drawn up solely as a pulse indicator of Soviet war intentions; i.e., hot war, and to straighten this out Mr. Armstrong's views on this subject were relayed to the Check List members by Mr. Childs.
- III. "Collaboration" is quite acceptable, and is what we seek to get by our concurrence procedure, but the "joint preparation" proposal of Army is vastly different and, in reality, goes far beyond the "Board of Directors" philosophy frequently enunciated by another member of the Intelligence ADVISORY Committee. If we go down the road of Army subjugation, where do we stop? Why not have a Check List Group on "the present German position and future courses of action." Adenauer's government may soon lead to world conquest problems which may bode ill for our national security to an extent comparable with present Soviet policies. Similarly, on our other numerable national intelligence production breakdowns, by following the Army suggestions, we could soon become a conglomerate agency of innumerable Watch Committees to evolve what we are established by law and by directive of the National Security Council to produce.
- IV. What the Army proposal points up is a problem that should cause some soul-searching within CIA itself, as to whether we are producing current usable coordinated National Intelligence, so geared as to be of ready aid to the Army and the other agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; and secondly, whether the agencies comprising the Intelligence ADVISORY Committee are so cooperating under present policies and procedures as to bring about the most efficient production by CIA of National Intelligence.

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